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The title of this Essay, "Judging Environmental Law," evokes 
several different themes. On the one hand, the title presents an occasion 
to discuss the role of judges in environmental law. On the other hand, it 
offers an opportunity to judge environmental law itself: whether 
environmental law is guilty, as charged by some in industry, of 
overreaching in its regulatory requirements; or, whether environmental 
law is instead guilty, as charged by some environmentalists, of 
underreaching, by failing to address pressing pollution control and 
natural resource management concerns. Finally, the title of the Essay 
possibly presents an occasion for a more theoretical inquiry: to consider 
the nature of environmental law itself. What, if anything, makes 
environmental law unique? Is environmental law just an incidental 
context for resolving legal disputes in which environmental quality and 
pollution control are at stake? Or is there something more unique about 
the nature of laws arising out of such disputes that warrants a distinct 
label? 
My objective is to tie together these three seemingly disparate 
themes. My thesis is that environmental law is one of the law's great 
success stories of the twentieth century. A major reason for its success, 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Essay is based on the 
Ninth Annual Dermot S. McGlinchey Lecture on Federal Litigation that I presented at Tulane 
University Law School on March 8, 2004. Thanks are owed to Tulane Law School for inviting 
me to deliver the lecture and to the law firm of McGlinchey Stafford PLLC for its support of the 
lecture series. I also benefited from outstanding research assistance from Rarnya 
Sivasubramanian, Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2005, and from J.R. Drabick, 
Georgetown University Law Center Class of2006. 
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moreover, has been the role of the judiciary. Yet, critical to the role of the 
judiciary has been judicial apprehension of the particular demands of 
environmental law: how and why it is unique and important. For that 
same reason, however, I am concerned about the future of environmental 
law. I am not as persuaded that judges today possess the necessary 
appreciation of the nature of environmental law. Indeed, judges today are 
more likely to harbor heightened skepticism toward, rather than 
solicitude for, environmental law. 
I. LOUIS FENNER CLAIBORNE AND THE ART OF MENTORING 
With regard to the first topic, the role of judges in environmental 
law, I would like to begin with what might seem like an aside, but which 
is most certainly not: the importance of mentoring. I have enjoyed a 
remarkably interesting career so far. Much of it has resulted, as is often 
the case, from the happenstance that I began my undergraduate studies 
and my professional career simultaneous with the emergence of modem 
environmental law in the United States. I was, accordingly, able to study 
modem environmental law in its earliest moments both in college and in 
law school during the 1970s. Upon graduation from law school in 1979, 
I had the opportunity to participate in environmental law's formative 
years, whether working on a Supreme Court case or teaching what I hope 
will be the next generation's leaders in environmental law. 
But I am also well aware that my own career has benefited from my 
early work with an extraordinary mentor: Louis Fenner Claiborne. 
Louis Claiborne was a 1953 graduate of Tulane University Law School.' 
Because Louis Claiborne graduated from Tulane more than fifty years 
ago, I do not expect that anyone on the current faculty recalls Claiborne 
as a student. But, I would be surprised if the name "Claiborne" did not 
ring more than a few bells here in New Orleans. 
Louis Claiborne came from a remarkable Louisiana family. His 
ancestor, William C.c. Claiborne, served as the first American governor 
of Louisiana.2 Claiborne Parish is named after William c.c. Claiborne.3 
Louis Claiborne's cousin, Craig Claiborne, was the famed chef.4 Another 
cousin, Lindy Claiborne Boggs, served as the American Ambassador to 
the Vatican and is the mother of celebrated news reporter, Cokie 
1. Richard Pearson, Louis Claibome Dies: Was Scholarly Deputy Solicitor General, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1999, at B6. 
2. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE-THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 160 (1987). 
3. Id 
4. E-mail from John Briscoe to Richard 1. Lazarus (June 23, 2004) (on file with author). 
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Roberts.s Louis Claiborne's sister, however, is no doubt the most famous 
of the modern Claiborne clan: Liz Claiborne, one of the most well-
known names worldwide in fashion design.6 
But for those of us who practice environmental law before the 
United States Supreme Court, there is only one famous Claiborne, and 
that is Louis. Louis Claiborne was one of the single most important 
lawyers in environmental law's formative years in the Court. He was 
without peer in his eloquence. He was widely celebrated for his use of 
language, both written and spoken. He was famous for his turns of 
phrases and for his truly extraordinary literary allusions.7 He served for 
many years as Deputy Solicitor General, and his jurisdiction extended to 
the environmental law cases before the Court. Between 1962 and 1985, 
he handled hundreds of cases and presented oral argument in seventy 
cases.
s 
Reinforcing the Louisiana theme, Louis Claiborne's own mentor 
was Judge Skelly Wright. Claiborne served as Judge Wright's senior law 
clerk from 1960 to 1962.9 Claiborne's path to Judge Wright's chambers 
is itself vintage Claiborne. Not long after graduating from Tulane, 
Claiborne worked in a small law firm and had the opportunity to argue at 
a very young age a case before the United States Supreme Court. It was 
a federal court abstention case, Lomsiana Power & Light Co. v. City of 
Thibodaux.lO Although his position did not prevail before the Court on 
the merits, Claiborne so impressed Justice Frankfurter that Frankfurter 
soon afterwards encountered his good friend United States District Judge 
Skelly Wright of New Orleans and asked Wright about Claiborne. When 
Judge Wright responded that he was not familiar with a Louis Claiborne, 
Justice Frankfurter reportedly responded that Wright should know of any 
lawyer in New Orleans as talented as Claiborne. I I Wright ultimately 
responded by hiring Claiborne as his law clerk. Upon completion of his 
clerkship, Judge Wright and Justice Frankfurter in turn contacted then 
Solicitor General Archibald Cox to press him to hire Claiborne as an 
attorney in the Solicitor General's Office.12 Despite apparent concerns 
5. Dayna Harpster, Claibome Rendezvous; Govemors Relatives Gather to Discuss 
History and a Mystery, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 3, 1999, at El. 
6. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 161. 
7. See John Briscoe, A Life of Law and Letters: Louis F. Claibome, 1927-1999,23 SUP. 
CT. RIST. Q. (Supreme Court Historical Soc'y, Washington, D.c.) 3, at 8-14 (2002). 
8. Id at 9. 
9. Pearson, supra note 1, at B6. 
10. 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
11. See CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 157. 
12. Id at 158. 
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about hiring a graduate of a law school other than Harvard, where Cox 
had taught, Cox acquiesced. 13 Claiborne started in the office as an 
assistant to the Solicitor General, was promoted to the Deputy Solicitor 
General position, and represented the United States in the Supreme Court 
in many of the most famous environmental and Indian law cases of the 
1970s and early 1980s.14 
II. JUDGE SKELLY WRIGHT AND THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Even more than his law clerk, Louis Claiborne, Judge Skelly Wright 
is a historic figure because of the role he played in the development of 
federal environmental law. To be sure, Judge Wright was most famous 
early on for his civil rights rulings as a federal district court judge in New 
Orleans. 15 Actually, "infamous" might be a more fitting label. Judge 
Wright issued demanding desegregation orders in 1960. His law clerk? 
Louis Claiborne. 16 Judge Wright's orders made Wright a hero to some, 
but not to all. At least one cross was burned on his lawn and he received 
multiple death threats. President John F. Kennedy appointed Judge 
Wright to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in 1962.17 An appointment to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, much closer to home, was not feasible. 
There was too much political opposition, meaning that Wright would 
have to leave the South in order to be elevated to a federal court of 
appeals. 18 
Louisiana's loss, however, was the nation's gain. Judge Wright 
continued to issue important civil rights rulings from the nc. Circuit. 
His dissent from the Pentagon Papers case became the majority in the 
Supreme COurt. 19 But one of his greatest contributions proved to be his 
promotion of environmental law. 
13. Id at 158-59. 
14. See Id at 155, 160, 162-69; see also Summa Corp. v. Cal. ex reI State Lands 
Cornm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (arguing for the United States as amicus curiae where the Supreme 
Court held that California could not assert public trust easement over property where the 
easement was not referenced in federal patent proceedings that confirmed the owner's interest). 
15. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 157. 
16. Letter from Joseph B. Stahl, Attorney-at-Law, to Richard 1 Lazarus, In re: 
Remembrance of Louis Fenner Claiborne (Apr. 24, 2000) (on file with author) ("[I]t was 
common knowledge that Louis was the ghostwriter of several of [Judge Wright's] most 
controversial opinions that had Ku Klux Klansmen leaving burning crosses on the Judge's 
lawn .... "). 
17. Bill Monroe, In Memoriam: J. Skelly Wn'ght, 102 HARv. L. REv. 361, 372 (1988). 
18. Seeid 
19. See United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) 
(Wright, C.l, dissenting), amended by 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.), aff(J, N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971). 
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Indeed, if one were to writel:!. Mo S U1Jo of environmental law 
judges of the twentieth century, one would undoubtedly see Judge 
Wright's name as one of the top judges on everyone's liseo Although 
modem environmental law is now more than thirty years old, there have 
likely been no more famous words written by a judge about 
environmental law than those penned by Judge Wright at the very 
beginning. It is fair to equate Judge Wright's early writing as one of the 
transformative moments in the legal revolution expressed by this nation's 
environmental law. As described by one law professor, Judge Wright's 
"phrasing launched more ships than Helen ofTroy.,,21 
Here is what Judge Wright wrote in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission in 1971,22 
involving a challenge based on the then-recently enacted National 
Environmental Policy Act of 196923 (NEPA)· to the Atomic Energy 
Commission's regulations for the consideration of environmental factors. 
These are words etched deeply in the mind of every law professor who 
has taught environmental law for three decades and words that have been 
read by the literally thousands of law students who have studied 
environmental law: 
These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a flood of 
new litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our 
natural environment. Several recently enacted statutes attest to the 
commitment of the Government to control, at long last, the destructive 
engine of material "progress." But it remains to be seen whether the 
promise of this legislation will become a reality. Therein lies the judicial 
role. . .. Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, 
heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast 
hallways of the federal bureaucracy,24 
This is an extraordinary statement by a judge. One would likely never 
see a judge use this kind oflanguage in a court opinion today. 
For those who know Judge Wright's judicial opinions, moreover, 
this is a particularly striking declaration. Judge Wright was not at all 
famous for promoting heightened judicial scrutiny of agency action, 
20. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of 
Environmental Law: "The Mats, " 2000 U. ILL. L REv. 1, 14. 
21. Jd (quoting e-mail from Zygmunt Plater, Professor, Boston College Law School,to 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor, University of Washington School of Law (Feb. 2, 1998) (on 
file with the Universityofminois Law Revievlj). 
22. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.c. Cir. 1971). 
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2000). 
24. 449 F.2d at III 1. 
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Quite the opposite. He was well known for advocating judicial deference 
to agency decisionmaking.25 
There are only two areas of law in which Wright departed from his 
general policy of judicial deference: civil rights law and environmental 
law. The answer to the riddle presented by his departure from practice in 
these two areas is that Wright understood the nature of environmental 
law. He appreciated what makes environmental law, like civil rights law, 
particularly in need of heightened judicial scrutiny to safeguard the 
interests of those less politically powerful (whether racial minorities or 
unborn future generations). 
What was Judge Wright's central insight about the nature of 
environmental lawmaking? Wright intuitively understood the inherent, 
structural reasons why environmental law is hard to make, maintain, and 
enforce over time. That basic intuition is what prompted him to insist on 
such a substantial, engaged, and active judicial role. 
The primary source of these difficulties is an inherent mismatch 
between two things: (1) features of the natural environment that are the 
subject of environmental law and (2) competing features of the U.S. law-
making institutions. Even more specifically, there are dominant 
characteristics of the problems presented by ecological cause and effect 
in the natural environment that generate the need for laws with features 
that are systematically difficult for the nation's law-making institutions to 
make and implement and that generate sustained legal and political 
opposition. It is because of this mismatch that environmental law can be 
exceedingly hard to make in the first instance, to maintain, and to enforce 
over time.26 
For example, the nature of ecological cause and effect is such that it 
spreads cause and effect out over large spatial dimensions. Activities in 
one part of the country cat?- affect environmental quality in locations tens, 
if not hundreds or thousands, of miles away. In the natural environment, 
cause and effect are also spread out over long periods of time. Actions 
taken today can have environmental impacts that last for centuries and, in 
some instances, do not even have any perceptible impact for decades. 
The upshot is both tremendous scientific uncertainty in cause and effect 
and an inherent lack of equivalency between who pays the costs of 
25. ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER,A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE" 89-90 (1984). 
26. See RICHARD 1. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5-42 (2004), for a 
lengthier, more complete discussion of the challenges of environmental lawmaking as they relate 
to the physical characteristics of ecological cause and effect and the structure and deliberate 
biases of U.S. law-making institutions. 
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environmental protection and who enjoys the benefits of that protection.27 
Environmental legal rules invariably regulate activities at one location 
and/or at one time in order to avoid harms or confer benefits on persons 
or environmental amenities at another place or time. 
It is a challenge for any legal regime to impose significant costs on 
the here and now for the benefit of the there and then. But there are 
particular features of this nation's law-making system that make meeting 
that challenge especially difficult. These features include the way in 
which we deliberately, by constitutional design, fragment law-making 
authority both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal fragmentation 
occurs both between and within branches of government. Within 
Congress, authority over environmental law issues is split among 
hundreds of committees and subcommittees. There are also the 
authorization and appropriations sides of congressional lawmaking, with 
very different perspectives and some different procedures. Vertical 
fragmentation of law-making authority is reflective of the Constitution's 
commitment to principles of federalism, emphasizing the limited powers 
of the federal government and the general authority of the states. The 
federal government lacks general police power, with the Constitution 
instead limiting its authority to discrete areas such as interstate and 
foreign commerce, spending, and property. But the Constitution's 
emphasis on federalism and decentralized authority, while reflective of 
important principles upon which the nation was founded, does present 
problems for environmental lawmaking. It lies in tension with the 
physical nature of the problem, which does not so neatly follow state 
borders and which naturally pits downstream and downwind states and 
localities against upstream and upwind states and localities.28 
Our nation also, importantly, includes constitutional provisions, 
such as Article Ill, which limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, and the 
Bill of Rights, which is designed to limit governmental intrusions on the 
individua1.29 The Constitution reflects a natural and often healthy 
skepticism of government and the potential for governmental 
overreaching, especially as it might adversely affect private property 
rights. Environmental laws, however, naturally challenge these 
limitations. Environmental protection requirements inherently limit the 
exercise of absolutist notions of private property rights in natural 
resources, as necessary to respond to enhanced perceptions of the spatial 
and temporal spil~over effects caused by natural resource development 
27. Seeidat16-28. 
28. See id at 29-42. 
29. U.S. CONST. art. III; id amends. I-X. 
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and physical exploitation. Environmental values similarly invite judicial 
intervention on behalf of plaintiffs who, because of the sometimes distant 
. spatial and temporal nature of ecological effect, cannot allege the kind of 
"imminent" and "concrete" injury normally necessary to establish Article 
III standing to sue in federal court. 30 
Judge Wright's insight in Calvert Cliffs is that he understood both 
these kinds of challenges and the corresponding responsibilities that 
arose for the federal judiciary. He intuitively appreciated the necessity 
for a "flood" of litigation.31 He understood why such a flood in this 
context was not a negative occurrence, as typically presumed in legal 
rhetoric seeking to avoid the "floodgates of litigation.'>32 The flood about 
which Wright wrote was a necessary part of a positive legal 
transformation of the nation's laws. Hence, a "flood" became for Wright 
a "promise" and not a threae3 
Judge Wright's Calvert Cliffs quotation also reflects the 
fundamental reasons why citizen suits and an active, vigilant judiciary 
are necessary for environmentallaw.34 He recognized that it is hard for 
Congress to enact environmental laws, which is why it occurred only at 
"long last.,,35 He further understood that the difficulties associated with 
the creation of environmental law in the first instance do not disappear 
simply upon their statutory enactment. Environmental laws are radical 
and unsettling in their import. They question traditional notions of 
"material" progress.36 They disrupt settled economic expectations and 
are riddled with political controversy. Further vigilance, including by the 
judiciary, is therefore necessary, as Judge Wright stresses in Calvert 
Cliffs, for the "promise" of the statutes to "become[] reality.,,37 Wright 
understood the political and economic pressures that would naturally be 
brought to bear on laws that sought to impose high costs on some for the 
benefit of others and how easy it is for such laws and policies to be "lost 
or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.,,38 It was to 
guard against just that possibility of bureaucratic diversion that Judge 
30. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring U11ats Environmental About Environmental Law 
in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 703, 749-52 (2000). 
31. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
32. Seeid 
33. SeeJd 
34. Seeid 
35. Seeid 
36. Seeid 
37. SeeJd 
38. Seeid 
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Wright defined the ')udicial role."39 "Therein lies the judicial role," he 
proclaimed.40 "Our duty," he declared.41 
Judge Wright, moreover, practiced what he preached. Calvert Cliffs 
transformed NEPA into the Magna Carta of modem environmental law. 
His jurisprudence helped spur the creation of a then-unprecedented 
citizen suit program enforcing NEPA. Judge Wright's decisions also 
prompted a major transformation within the vast hallways of the federal 
government. NEPA changed the nature of those who worked for the 
federal government. As environmental factors became relevant to federal 
agency decisionmaking, those same agencies frequently needed to hire 
in-house experts. NEPA empowered environmental-miss ion-oriented 
offices within the federal government such as the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Council on 
Environmental Quality, among others, all of which are regularly 
consulted as part of the NEPA planning process.42 
Judge Wright's significant environmental opinions extend far 
beyond Calvert Cliffs. He authored the court's opinion in Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States in 1972.43 
In that case, the federal court (a three-judge panel) upheld citizen 
standing for environmentalists to challenge Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) rates based upon their possible impact on recycling.44 
The court rejected a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the 
government's contention that the chain of causation between the ICC 
rates and the amount of recycling was too attenuated and the plaintiffs 
therefore could demonstrate only a generalized interese5 The court no 
doubt recognized that such attenuated chains of causation are often the 
grist of the environmental mill because of the nature of ecological cause 
and effect, particularly its spreading out of cause and effect over great 
spatial and temporal dimensions. The court thereby both recognized the 
importance of citizen suit oversight in environmental law and 
substantially facilitated it. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld 
Judge Wright's standing ruling in a decision widely considered the high 
39. Seeid 
40. Id 
41. Id 
42. See NEPA § 102, 42 US.C. § 4332 (2000) ("Prior to making any detailed statement, 
the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency 
which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact 
involved."); NEPA § 204, 42 US.c. § 4344 (describing duties and functions of the Council on 
Environmental Quality). 
43. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev(J on other grounds, 412 US. 669 (1973). 
44. Id at 195-96. 
45. Id 
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water mark of environmental citizen suit standing.46 And, as revealed by 
the papers recently released by Justice Blackmun, including his 
conference notes in the case, the Justices expressly acknowledged Judge 
Wright's role. Blackmun's notes indicate that the Chief Justice, Warren 
Burger, who apparently was no fan of Judge Wright, blamed the lower 
court outcome on Wright's having done a "snow job" on United States 
District Judge Thomas A. Flannery, who was then a new judge sitting on 
the panel in what Burger described as Flannery's "1st case.''''7 
In Wildemess Society v. Morton, Judge Wright in 1973 authored a 
D.c. Circuit opinion that imposed obstacles that temporarily impeded the 
construction of the Alaska Pipeline.48 The court strictly applied 
congressionally determined limited rights of ways.49 Although the 
pipeline was ultimately built, following congressional passage of further 
legislation, the early litigation transformed pipeline planning. Planning, 
as delayed, became far more deliberate and careful. As industry 
representatives later acknowledged, if the early plans had been followed, 
it might well have been an economic and environmental disaster. 50 
Finally, Judge Wright also wrote the D.c. Circuit's 1976 opinion in 
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,5l which, thirty years later, is still widely read and 
discussed. 52 In that case, the court upheld the EPA's decision under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate lead as an additive to gasoline.53 Here, 
again, the court's opinion reflects a ftmdamental awareness of the nature 
of environmental law. The opinion describes the enormous scientific 
uncertainty surrounding cause and effect and explains that "[ q]uestions 
involving the environment are particularly prone to uncertainty.,,54 And, 
rather than perceive such uncertainty as a bar to regulatory lawmaking, 
46. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 
683-90 (1973). 
47. The Honorable Harry Blackmun, Official Papers, U.S. Library of Conferences, Box 
# 168, Case No. 72-553, Conference Notes· (1973). Blackmun's handwritten notes of the 
comments made by each justice provide under Chief Justice Burger: "s Wright did a sno job-
Flannery's I st case." Id 
48. 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
49. See id at 875-84. 
50. RUSSELL E. TRAIN, POLmcs, POLLUTION, AND PANDAS-AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MEMOIR 63 (2003) (''And Thornton Bradshaw, president and chief operating officer of ARCO at 
the time, told me privately after the pipeline was in operation that, had it been built according to 
the original specifications, the result would have been a disaster environmentally and 
economically."). 
51. 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
52. Se~ e.g., ROBERT V PERCNAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 340, 346, 353-61, 363-64, 558 (4th ed. 2003); ZYGMUNT lB. PLATER ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 268-69, 744, 825 (3d ed. 2004). 
53. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 55. 
54. Id 
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the court concludes that Congress endorsed EPA's effective invocation of 
a precautionary principle in its rulemaking.55 
In short, Congress placed the ambitious environmental statutes on 
the books in the 1970s, but it was the judiciary, led by judges like Judge 
Skelly Wright, who made it actually happen. They invited and spurred 
the filing of environmental citizen suits. They compelled those agencies 
to adhere to the strict terms of the statutes, overcoming bureaucratic 
friction or, alternatively, allowing the career employees to overcome the 
resistance of political employees. 
The upshot? Any fair judgment of environmental law's record 
during the past several decades would have to rate it as one ofthe nation's 
great success stories of the second half of the twentieth century. The 
judiciary accomplished a revolutionary change in the nation's laws. In 
pollution control, we witnessed passage of comprehensive laws such as 
the CAA,56 the Clean Water Act (CWA),57 the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA)/8 and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).59 In the area of 
natural resources law, Congress enacted ambitious laws such as the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,60 the Alaska National 
Interest Lands & Conservation Act,61 the Federal Land Policy & 
Management Act,62 the Endangered Species Act (ESA),63 the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act,64 and, of course, NEPA.65 
The doomsayers at the time predicted that the nation's economy 
would grind to a halt under the weight of these new, demanding pollution 
control and natural resource management laws. Commentators 
repeatedly predicted that the nation would soon abandon its 
environmental aspirations once their actual costs became apparent.66 
What happened? The nation's economy grew between 1970 and 
2000 faster than ever. There were tremendous increases in economic 
growth. But, so, too, were there significant advances achieved in 
environmental protection. There were dramatic decreases in many 
55. See id at 13,24-28. 
56. 42 US.c. §§ 7401-7671q (2000). 
57. 33 US.c. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
58. 42 US.c. §§ 6901-6992k. 
59. Id §§ 9601-9675. 
60. 30 US.c. §§ 1201-1328 (2000). 
61. 16 US.c. §§ 3101-3233 (2000). 
62. 43 US.c. §§ 1701-1785 (2000). 
63. 16 US.c. §§ 1531-1544. 
64. 43 US.c. §§ 1801-1866. 
65. 42 US.C. §§ 4321-4307f(2000). 
66. LAZARUS, supra note 26, at 251-52. 
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pollutants. There was cleaner air in many places. Emissions of the six 
principal pollutants regulated by the CAA went down by forty-eight 
percent. 67 In 1970, only one-third of the nation's waters were safe for 
fishing and swimming. Now, over two-thirds of the waters are reportedly 
safe.68 The country has enjoyed some reversals of environmentally 
destructive trends in some areas while, in other areas of environmental 
quality, we have at least held even notwithstanding huge increases in 
economic growth and resource exploitation. The costs· of such 
environmental controls, moreover, have almost always been substantially 
lower than predicted by industry in opposing adoption of the laws in the 
first instance. The true proponents of exaggerated rhetoric have 
seemingly far more often been those in industry rather than 
environmentalists.69 
Are there significant gaps and looming problems? Absolutely. 
Approximately one hundred forty-six million Americans live in places 
where national ambient air quality standards are exceeded. 70 We have 
largely failed to impose effective controls on nonpoint sources of 
pollution, especially of water pollution, which threaten to overwhelm the 
environmental progress achieved by controls imposed on point source 
industrial dischargers of pollution into the nation's waters.71 
There is also increasing reason to believe that there have been 
environmental injustices in the resulting distribution of the costs and 
benefits of environmental protection, including in the reduction of risks 
achieved by those laws and the redistribution of residual risks they create. 
Not all communities nationwide are necessarily better off because of 
environmental laws. Poor communities and communities of color can 
receive the economic brunt of environmental protection laws without any 
corresponding enjoyment of the benefits. Indeed, some communities· 
may in fact be worse off because of increased environmental risks 
67. See William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for 
Pn"vate Land Use Control, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 24 n.81 (2004) (citing EPA, 4541K-03-001, 
LATEST FINDINGS ON NATIONAL AIR QUALITY: 2002 STATUS AND TRENDS 1-2 (Aug. 2003), 
aV8J1able at http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/reports.html [hereinafter LATEST FINDINGS]). 
68. See Jonathan Rauch, Amen"ca Celebrates Earth Day 1970-For the 31st Time, 32 
NAT'LJ. 1333 (2000). 
69. LAZARUS, supra note 26, at 251-52. 
70. LATEST FINDINGS, supra note 67. 
71. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Uilter Quality Standards-Based 
Regulation Under the Clean Uilter Ac~ 27 ENVTL. L. REp. 10,329 (1997); Oliver A. Houck, The 
Clean Uilter Act TMDL Program V' Aftershock and Prelude, 32 ENVTL. L. REp. 10,385 (2002). 
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transferred from other communities to their own with the placement of a 
hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility.72 
These remaining problems are serious and significant, but they are 
consistent with the bottom line positive assessment of environmental 
law's extraordinary accomplishments during the past several decades. 
Ours is a nation that has not witnessed the kind of wholesale ecological 
destruction suffered elsewhere, such as in Eastern Europe. 
Notwithstanding the considerable challenges presented by the enactment 
and implementation. of environmental law in our deliberately fragmented 
system of lawmaking, the United States' experience has demonstrated the 
potential compatibility between environmental protection law and 
democratic, open government. Nor is environmental law today the 
disruptive agent that it once seemed more than thirty years ago. 
Pollution control and natural resource management laws have by now 
settled into the legal landscape. They have become part of the legal 
fabric that generates many of the nation's economic expectations. Rather 
than frustrate economic expectations, they are just as likely now to create 
them. For instance, important industries such as real estate, tourism, and 
fishing all frequently depend upon maintaining and enhancing the quality 
of the natural environment. Real estate and tourism find much of their 
value in a water vista, clean air, and quiet solitude. The fishing industry 
depends on water quality capable of maintaining fish stocks. There is a 
distinct billion dollar pollution-control industry in the United States, 
directly derived from pollution control laws, that employs more than one 
million people.?3 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW'S LATEST CHALLENGE: THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 
For this reason, one of the great contemporary ironies is that one of 
the most significant challenges to environmental law's ability to maintain 
the course comes from the federal judiciary. Today, the federal judiciary 
frequently appears skeptical of environmental protection law. Federal 
judges see the same tensions between the challenges of environmental 
lawmaking and our constitutional system of lawmaking that Judge 
Wright perceived. But because many of today's judges are not nearly as 
persuaded of the necessity and wisdom of existing environmental laws, 
72. See Richard 1. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice'~' The Distributional ERects 
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993). See generaliyLUKE COLE & SHEILA 
FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP-ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE MOVEMENT 167-83 (2001) (presenting an annotated bibliography of studies). 
73. LAZARUS, supmnote 26, at 162. 
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they see those same tensions as causes for concern rather than reasons 
for accommodation. 
Compare, for example, Judge Wright's Calvert Cliffs opinion to the 
views of another prominent jurist today. Here is what the latter wrote in 
an indirect, yet still obvious, reference to Calvert Cliffs. He decried what 
he described as the 'judiciary's long love affair with environmental 
litigation.,,74 He argued that it was a mistake to provide broad citizen suit 
access to trigger judicial oversight of environmental regulatory action. 
Even more boldly, the jurist candidly acknowledged the policy 
implications of his legal position: 
Does what I have said mean that ... "important legislative purposes, 
heralded in the halls of Congress [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast 
hallways of the federal bureaucracy?" Of course it does-and a good 
thing, too.... [L lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or 
misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday's herald is today's 
b 75 ore .... 
What radical penned these words? What judge was willing to suggest 
that environmental law, once a "herald," is now a "bore?" The answer: 
Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme COurt.76 
Like Judge Wright in an earlier era, Justice Scalia practices what he 
preaches. Since Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986, he has 
successfully instigated the Court's heightened questioning of citizen suit 
standing and he has promoted the erection of higher jurisdictional 
hurdles for citizen suits in environmental cases.77 The Court has 
resurrected once-seemingly antiquated limits on Congress's Commerce 
Clause authority/8 casting doubt on a broad reading of the jurisdictional 
reach of federal environmental statutes such as the CWA79 and, for some 
lower court judges, on the ESA as wel1.80 The Court has reinvigorated the 
74. Antonin Scalia, The Doetrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U L. REv. 881, 884 (1983). 
75. Id at 897. 
76. Id at 881. 
77. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004); Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 US. 83 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 US. 154, 176-77 (1997); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 US. 871 
(1990). 
78. United States v. Lopez, 514 US. 549, 558-60 (1995). 
79. See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 
531 US. 159 (2001). 
80. See GDF Realty lnvs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir.), reh'g en bane denied, 
362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2003) (Jones, 1., joined by Jolly, Smith, Demoss, Clement, & 
Pickering, J1., dissenting); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 48, 506 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, 1., 
dissenting); Rancho Viego, L.L.c. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, reh 'g en bane denied, 334 F.3d 1158 
(D.c. Cir. 2003) (Sentelle & Roberts, JI, dissenting). 
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Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and, consequently, prompted increased 
regulatory takings challenges by property owners aggrieved by the extent 
to which environmental laws may restrict their exercise of private rights 
in natural resources.81 And, based on the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 
has overruled its own precedent that allowed citizens to sue states for 
monetary recovery under CERCLA.82 
Like Judge Wright, Justice Scalia understands the implications of 
the nation's environmental laws. But, while Judge Wright saw a need for 
legal evolution and accommodation, Justice Scalia perceives 
environmental law as a threat to be cabined. Not because he, or anyone 
else on the Court, is against environmentalism or environmental 
protection per se. But, instead because they harbor concerns about the 
kinds of laws and law-making institutions that environmentalism 
inevitably promotes in lawmaking: the tendencies to redistribute 
economic value, limit private property rights, promote citizen suit access 
to judicial review of agency action, promote centralized authority in 
federal administrative agencies, and intrude upon the unimpeded 
operation of free market forces.83 
Justice Scalia is also not a lone voice on the current Court in his 
apparent harboring of these kinds of concerns. In the recent October 
2003 Term there were seven environmental cases before the United 
States Supreme COurt.84 That is a remarkable number. It represents 
almost ten percent of the Court's entire docket of cases to be heard on the 
merits, which numbered fewer than seventy-five. But what is even more 
remarkable than just the sheer number of cases is their procedural 
posture. In all seven of those cases, the Court granted review in cases in 
which the lower courts had ruled in a manner that environmentalists 
favored. The impression created is that the Court is concerned when 
environmentalists win, but not when they lose. In other areas of law, the 
Court's docket does not seem similarly skewed. For instance, although 
the Court's reputation is one that is predisposed towards the prosecution 
in criminal cases, a review of death penalty and criminal procedure cases 
before the Supreme Court during the 2000 Term through the 2002 Term 
81. Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
82. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-72 (1996). 
83. LAZARUS, supra note 26, at 132-37. 
84. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 2576 
(2004); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004); Dep't ofTransp. v. Pub. 
Citizen, 124 S. Ct. 2204 (2004); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. 
Ct. 1756 (2004); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004); Alaska Dep't of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004). 
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shows that the criminal defendants were the petitioners in thirteen out of 
twenty-two cases.85 
What is even more remarkable about the number of environmental 
cases recently before the Court and their procedural posture is that many 
did not seem like likely Supreme Court cases. The traditional criteria for 
Supreme Court review were lacking. In some, the Court granted 
certiorari in the absence of circuit conflicts and where there was no 
obvious legal issue of transcendent national importance.86 There was 
even one case where the statute being construed applied in only one state 
out offifty.87 
It is certainly true that once the Court grants review and decides 
cases on the merits, its actual rulings are not nearly so skewed. There are 
major Supreme Court rulings favorable and unfavorable to 
environmentalists. In 2001, the Court unanimously upheld the CAA 
against a constitutional challenge based on the nondelegation doctrine.88 
The majority has repudiated much of Justice Scalia's narrow views of 
citizen suit standing89 as well as some of his efforts to reinvigorate even 
more fully regulatory takings challenges.9o Also in the 2003 Term, the 
Court rejected by a vote of five to four a narrow reading of the CAA, 
which would have circumscribed the EPA's authority to oversee state 
implementation of the CAA.91 The Court likewise rejected a narrow 
reading of the CWA.92 
Since those earlier rulings in the October 2003 Term, however, the 
Court has handed business interests a series of sweeping wins. The 
Court vacated a court of appeals decision that upheld the right of a 
regional air pollution control authority to require owners and operators of 
85. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 US. 318 (2001); Kyllo v. United States, 533 US. 27 
(2001); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 US. 67 (2001); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 US. 36 
(2001); Ohio v. Reiner, 532 US. 17 (2001); United States v. Knights, 534 US. 112 (2001); United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 US. 266 (2002); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US. 304 (2002); Kelly v. South 
Carolina, 534 US. 246 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 US. 162 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 
584 (2002); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 US. 101 (2003); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US. 322 
(2003); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 US. 510 (2003); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 US. 626 (2003). 
86. See, e.g., Alaska Dep'tofEnvtl. Conservation, 124 S. Ct. at 983. 
87. See BedRoc Ltd, 124 S. Ct. at 1587 (interpreting rights to minerals stemming from 
the Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919,43 US.c. §§ 351-355 (repealed 1964), applicable 
only in Nevada). 
88. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 US. 457 (2001). 
89. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 US. 167, 180-89 (2000). 
90. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 US. 302, 320-22 
(2002). 
91. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 124 S. Ct. 
983, 1002-06 (2004). 
92. S. Fla. Mgmt. Agency v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 1254 S. Ct. 1537, 1542-45 
(2004). 
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fleets of vehicles to purchase more low-emission vehicles.93 The Court 
held that the CAA preempted state and local authorities from unilaterally 
imposing such requirements.94 The Court also unanimously overturned a 
court of appeals judgment that held that a federal transportation agency 
violated both the CAA and NEPA by failing to account adequately for 
the adverse environmental consequences of the agency's promulgation of 
regulations that allow increased commercial traffic from Mexico (upon 
the lifting of a Presidential moratorium).95 One week later, in yet another 
unanimous decision, the Court ruled against a grassroots environmental 
organization that had won in the lower courts in its effort to obtain 
judicial oversight of a federal agency's failure to take adequate measure 
to guard against degradation of a potential wilderness area caused by 
significantly increased off-road vehicle use.96 In ruling that the federal 
courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain such lawsuits, the Court created a 
potentially insurmountable hurdle to environmental citizen efforts to 
bring lawsuits designed to make sure that statutory and regulatory 
environmental protections are not, recalling Judge Skelly Wright's words 
in Calvert Cliffs, "lost" or "misdirected" in the "vast hallways of the 
federal bureaucracy.,,97 Finally, the Court stalled environmentalist efforts, 
similarly successful in the lower courts, to obtain through pretrial 
discovery from the Office of the Vice President copies of documents that 
citizen plaintiffs claimed would demonstrate the extent to which private 
industry determined the substantive content of the Vice President's 
National Energy Plan.98 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the stakes for environmental law's future right now in 
the courts are as high as they were in the 1970s during environmental 
law's formative years. Notwithstanding the passage of more than three 
decades of modem environmental law here in the United States, courts 
are still struggling to answer a host of difficult issues arising from 
challenges presented by environmental lawmaking. These issues pertain 
to: (1) the respective roles of federal, state, and tribal sovereign 
93. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1764-65 
(2004). 
94. Id 
95. Dep't ofTransp. v. Pub. Citizen, 124 S. Ct. 2204 (2004). 
96. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004). 
97. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
98. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 2576 
(2004). 
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authorities; (2) the respective responsibilities of the various branches of 
government in overseeing the work of the other branches; and (3) the 
extent to which private property rights in natural resources can be fairly 
limited. 
The stakes are, however, in some respects even higher than before 
because the political dynamic in the federal government has dramatically 
shifted since the 1970s. Until the 104th Congress in the mid-1990s, 
Congress was a major player, especially the standing authorization 
committees through their increasing attention over time to the details of 
federal environmental law. Since that time, Congress's normal law-
making ability has been dramatically circumscribed as a result of 
entrenched partisan stalemates. Nothing can be enacted, apart from 
nontransparent and nondeliberative riders attached to massive 
appropriations bills.99 
The upshot is more and more executive branch lawmaking at the 
outer edge of statutory authority. Whether it is the Clinton 
Administration trying to reach further than the existing law may plainly 
authorize, or the Bush Administration trying to do less than what existing 
law may plainly require, the resulting legal issues, when lawsuits are 
brought against the executive branch, are left to the courts. 
With the resolution of these legal issues turning once again to the 
courts, the nation needs, more than ever, the kind of eloquent, forceful 
advocacy once presented by Tulane's own Louis Claiborne. And it needs 
the kind of brilliant, insightful judging once provided by Louisiana's own 
Skelly Wright to address these issues. It takes great judges and great 
advocates to make and to keep great law. And environmental law is no 
exception. 
99. See LAZARUS, supra note 26, at 159-60. 
